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CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS. By Harry Shulman and Neil AV. Chamberlain.
Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1949. Pp. x, 1266. $8.00.
SINCE this book is the first of its kind-a "non-legal" case book on labor re-
lations designed (though not exclusively) for law students'-it is not out of
place to comment briefly on the relevance of such a volume for a law-school
course. Being an economist, this reviewer can indulge in such assessment
without being accused of protecting a vested interest in the legal teaching ter-
ritory, although he is fully aware of the charge of ignorance to which he
thereby leaves himself open.
During the last two decades we have undergone an "orderly revolution" in
labor relations. The effects of this revolution have been many and varied,
but for the purpose in hand the most significant impact has been the growing
importance of lawyers in formulating and administering labor relations policies
throughout different segments of the community. We all know, for instance,
that the legal minds in the top executive positions of our large corporations
now have to read the CIO News as well as the Wall Street Journal. Less
obvious, although equally important, is the fact that in less lofty executive
posts we find lawyers handling day-to-day labor issues. In that context,
General Motors is the classical illustration, but there are many others. Our
legislators-at both state and federal levels-now find their "intellectual"
chores greatly increased because collective bargaining must be reckoned with;
and our legislators (I am told) stem predominantly from the legal profession.
Nor should one omit the employees of a number of governmental adminis-
trative agencies from the roll call of lawyers who earn their livelihood by
grappling with labor relations problems.
It is not illogical, therefore, to aver that the legal training of today should
include something more than a nodding acquaintance with labor questions.
And such an insight cannot be gained from the various "labor law" courses
now fairly common in our universities. There are many reasons for such a
view, but one will suffice at this juncture: The vast bulk of the issues arising
in the relationships between management and workers would not be reflected,
either directly or indirectly, in any assortment of labor-law cases that one
could accumulate. Under the circumstances, therefore, a study of "non-
legal" material by law students means more than acquiring a "cultural back-
ground"; it involves the acquisition of a technical expertise.
So much for the need of "non-legal" cases in law school labor courses.
How well does this book meet that need? The authors have limited themselves
1. The book is released under strongly legal auspices: The senior author is a dis-
tinguished professor of law, the publishing house has long been specializing in legal
tomes, the volume itself is part of a legal series, and the material is presented in the
manner characteristic of legal case books. But the work is not thereby vrbotln to any-
one outside the legal fraternity. Actually, this reviewer is relying heavily on it in one
of his industrial relations courses.
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to issues arising during the life of the collective bargaining contract-so-called
disputes of rights. That the relationship between the parties for the duration
of the contract is an important aspect of collective bargaining is undeniable,
even though it may not be "the heart . . . of collective bargaining," as the
authors assert. Within the confines thus set, Professors Shulman and Cham-
berlain present arbitrators' decisions on such problems as layoffs and recalls,
job transfers, discipline, promotions, demotions, wages, hours, etc. They
have not been content with presenting only "current issues"; some cases go
back several decades. And this welter of material, it might be added, is ad-
mirably organized.
Without duplicating the authors' efforts, no reader of the book is in a posi-
tion to say whether they have chosen a "representative sample" of the avail-
able cases. But they have selected discriminately enough to afford the student
a "feel" for many issues that arise during the life of the collective bargain-
ing contract. The student will also find conflicting opinions by different
arbitrators on "similar" issues, which should prove both instructive and stim-
ulating.
The numerous cases in this volume serve to underline certain important
facts about the arbitration of disputes that arise between management and the
union in the course of administering a contract. Some of these are worthy
of note. First, there are no general principles of sufficient operating precision
in terms of which such disputes can be easily handled. The arbitrator's basic
function is clear enough in all cases: to hand down an award which will best
meet the needs of both parties. But what constitutes the needs of the parties
will vary from situation to situation depending upon the personal and in-
stitutional forces at play. An "ideal" decision under the UAW-Ford contract
might prove totally unworkable under the UAW-GM agreement. The very
role assigned by the parties to the arbitrator will itself vary from case to case
precisely because of these institutional and personal factors.
Secondly, the assertion that an arbitrator in a dispute of rights does not
make policy is totally erroneous. It is obvious that when the arbitrator is
called upon to render a decision on a point not covered at all in the contract,
his decision is as much a policy standard as that of an arbitrator deciding a
dispute of interests. Less obvious, but equally important, is the fact that
even in decisions involving the interpretation of the contract, the arbitrator
is making policy. The contract is not drawn so that any such dispute can be
settled by an "intelligent reading of the agreement." Instead, there are im-
plications and nuances which are anything but self-evident. And it is the
arbitrator's views on these matters that become the standards by which the
parties must live. To deny that this is policy-making is to split hairs but
ignore reality.
Finally, and stemming from the preceding comments, the arbitrator has a
far more difficult task than merely "splitting the difference" in all cases. His
is a function which calls for a real contribution to the problem. Among other
things, he must be in a position to discern factors in the situation which
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escape the parties and which, when skillfully applied, make for a more work-
able solution. In a word, the successful arbitrator must be constructively
imaginative. And his ideas are no less "creative" simply because they stem
from the hard facts of reality instead of being conceived in the ivory tower
of academic insulation.
JOSEPH SxsTv0
READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HisToRy. By Mark DeWolfe Howe. Cam-
bridge: The Harvard University Press, 1949. Pp. x, 529. $7.50.
HowE's book will be the first tangible evidence to many that a nev subject
matter, American legal history, is finding its way into law school curricula.
There had been scattered work before in other fields of legal history. Radin
at California, Woodbine and Thorne at Yale, Haskins at Pennsylvania, Goebel
at Columbia, to name only some of the outstanding, have worked in Roman,
or continental, or English, or colonial legal history. But the law schools are
barely beginning analysis of a new subject, 19th and 20th century American
legal history. Indiana, Yale, and Harvard have recently offered courses.
Professor Hurst at Wisconsin, aided by a Rockefeller foundation fellowship
program, is just beginning the training of teachers who will spread a new
gospel of history training in law schools.
An appraisal of a course book for existing and potential legal history
courses necessarily involves a judgment as to the function those courses
should perform. But the whole field is still in so formative a state that no
two programs even remotely resemble each other; and a credo for a course
must therefore be intensely personal.
The study of American legal history is, in the bread and butter sense, twice
useful. First, it is systematic training in a method of analysis and presenta-
tion of legal materials. The historical method is one way of putting prece-
dents where they belong, in the perspective of the reasons for their being.
Legal history has a utility apart from the substantive courses which explore
reasons as well as rubrics; no matter how well taught, these courses have a
primary purpose of exploring substance. The historical method, as used in
law, is sufficiently complex to require status as more than a by-product of a
study of something else. Second, though this is subsidiary, the study of his-
tory provides at least some substantive information which can help the student
to integrate or illuminate other parts of his legal training.
An independent value, quite apart from bread and butter utility, is the
aesthetic virtue of historical studies. We lawyers have, many of us, chosen
a profession not only as a source of income but also as an object of our live-
liest intellectual interest. We want to know about the role of the profession
in national life, about the beginnings of equity practice in America, about the
relation of property law to the growth of our state, or about whatever else it
' School of Business Administration, University of Buffalo.
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is that stirs our individual interests. We want to know for the most impel-
ling, if the simplest, of reasons-simply because we enjoy knowing.
In this view, a coursebook in legal history is to be appraised in terms of its
utility for the teaching of method, the incidental acquisition of practically
useful substantive information, and the exploration of the interesting. Yet
because a coursebook in an untried field is for the most part a projection of
the interests of its editor, the utility of the book depends peculiarly on the
background and enthusiasms of the individual who uses it.
Hence the Howe book will doubtless have its maximum utility exactly
where it should, in Howe's hands. These materials are sufficiently tailored
to Howe's own interests to make it improbable that another teacher would
find them useful in the classroom. They are properly described by the title
as "readings," rather than text materials, and are a collection of excerpts
centering around the migration and modification of the English common law,
first in the colonies, then in the inland states, and finally in codes. The colonial
materials, approximately a third of the book, are drawn from Massachusetts
exclusively.
In so far as he may desire to train his students in putting the rules of law
into their social perspective, Howe must rely on lectures or outside readings
not included here. For example, a sixty page section on the troubles with
France in 1798 and the Alien and Sedition Acts are edited to present the neat
question of whether the federal government can punish common law offenses.
The student presumably learns from other sources what made these disputes
the life and death stuff of politics, as well as how that political significance
affected the legal dispute. Liberal assignments in collateral texts may per-
haps permit more significant analysis than the materials themselves suggest.
Viewed from the standpoint of substantive information afforded-whether
for purposes of practical use or of aesthetic appreciation-the Howe experi-
ment demonstrates that the source book device will not by itself provide a
satisfactory solution to the materials problem in American legal history. The
case method, with its variants, is too wasteful of time to fit with historical
survey work. If a standard introductory American history course in the col-
leges were taught from original sources in the detail which Howe uses here,
the student who began at Plymouth Rock would probably end his first year's
studies somewhere between Valley Forge and Yorktown. So long as Ameri-
can legal history is fighting for two or three credits worth of the whole time
of the law student's education, this extreme slowness of pace is undesirable.
This is not to suggest that law school history courses ought to be slick sur-
veys aimed at giving the student a nodding acquaintance with a few judges,
putting a veneer of "culture" on the graduate. The point is that the choice
between overly intensive and overly extensive history courses can be resolved
by modifying the reliance on original source material. The pinpoint aspect of
source book legal history is illustrated in the Howe book, where the entire
volume studies one small, narrowly construed problem with primary reference
to the experience of one colony. One answer for other teachers may be the
reliance, partial at least, on text materials. But assuming that source materials
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should be used as the primary reference, they ought to be selected over a far
wider range of topics and then linked together by the lecture method. The
solution may be in a combination of the source material, the lecture, and the
textual devices to broaden the range of study.
Yet these criticisms cannot be made with assurance. Because American
legal history is still so experimental, the most important aspect of Howe's
book is its evidence that he, a skilled historian, has found for the moment at
least a method satisfactory to himself of teaching in the field. Howe concedes
in his preface that "some readers" may think his concentration on Mfassa-
chusetts material "bespeaks the arid enthusiasm of an antiquarian." I confess
to being such a reader, though doubtless Howe makes vivid in his classroom
such items as his eight excerpts from the journals and papers of John Win-
throp. If old Governor Winthrop could launch not only justice in Massa-
chusetts in the 17th century, but also American legal history at Harvard in
the 20th, he is perhaps worth dusting off.
JoHN P. FRAN#
THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE AND SOCIL
CONTROL. By Julius Stone. Sydney: Associated General Publications Pty.
Ltd., 1946. Pp. lxiv, 918. $15.00.
IN the maze of currents and cross-currents that characterize contemporary
writing on jurisprudence and legal philosophy there are not many points on
which common agreement can be found. But one point on which representa-
tives of the most widely disparate views might agree is that Julius Stone has
provided us with the best general introduction to jurisprudence that has yet
appeared in the English language. This is not to say that Stone has a keener
mind or a more fertile imagination or a more felicitous style or a broader
scholarship than Austin, Maine, Holmes or Pound. But jurisprudence, de-
spite all the battle-cries and advertisements of the conflicting schools, is a
cumulative enterprise like science or music. It is possible for a rational being
to grasp the varied insights that Austin, Maine, Holmes, Pound, and many
other original thinkers during the past two or three thousand years have con-
tributed to our understanding of law. In science, it is not necessary to reject
Euclidean geometry in order to make use of the non-Euclidean geometries of
Riemann or Lobachewsky; we can, and do, use all three in different contexts.
Just so, one may enjoy Bach and Wagner, or Homer and Swinburne, on the
same evening. It is Stone's great merit that he has not accepted the popular
picture of legal philosophy as a bad play wherein each actor kills off all his
predecessors on the stage. Nor has Stone followed the practice made standard
by his revered teacher and one time colleague, Roscoe Pound, of pigeon-holing
each legal thinker within a particular century, country, and school, explaining
how he got into that particular pigeon-hole, and passing on quickly to the next
pigeon-hole. Rather, he has had the insight to appreciate the character of legal
philosophy (and of philosophy generally) as a great cooperative human enter-
tAssodate Professor, Yale Law School.
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prise stretching across many generations, a continuous and cumulative ex-
ploration of possible perspectives through which life's many-faceted problems
can be viewed. This quality of intellectual tolerance or catholicity that per-
meates Stone's appreciation of what other thinkers have tried to say is rare
enough in contemporary jurisprudence, and important enough for the juris-
prudence of the future, to warrant more attention than any of the particular
insights which brighten the 982 pages and 3,156 or more footnotes of this
volume.
At the heart of Mr. Stone's sanity is the appreciation that two people who
use the same word are not always talking about the same thing. With the
help of this simple logical perception, Stone is able to avoid wasting time on
the standard pseudo-questions of comparative jurisprudence, e.g., "Which
comes first, law or the state ?" or "What is the true definition of law ?" H-e is
able to appreciate that what Austin had to say about the difference between
the commands of a sovereign and other modes of social control still makes
good sense, and at the same time to appreciate Maine's or Ehrlich's explora-
tion of the inter-relations between the many forms of social pressure that dif-
ferent people have called "law". In all of Stone's account, one finds no rout-
ing of a "natural law" school by a "historical" school, no destruction of
"analytical" or "realistic" jurisprudence by a jurisprudence that is unanalyti-
cal or unrealistic, no gobbling up of all previous schools by a "sociological"
school. Instead, there is a full appreciation of the fact that many different
questions may reasonably be asked about law, that one who searches for the
historical origin of a rule has no business quarreling with somebody else who
seeks to dissect its logical structure, and that neither of them has any right,
on the basis of his own legal studies, to contradict somebody else who seeks
to ascertain the justice or injustice of the rule or to measure the impact of the
rule on society. Only when any of these scholars steps outside the province of
his research to denounce as worthless or invalid the efforts of others to answer
other questions does the possibility of logical contradiction emerge. And
while such contradictory claims are sometimes made, and, when made, help to
evaluate the character of the maker, they are not, after all, a substantial part
of jurisprudence or philosophy.
The synoptic vision that characterizes Stone's volume is not the superficial
tolerance of an eclectic anthologist. Nor is it a neo-Hegelian attempt to show
that every significant contribution to jurisprudence incorporates and replaces
all prior thinking. What gives balance and sanity to this study is the recogni-
tion that the house of jurisprudence contains many mansions. And what
makes the appearance of this volume a prime event for lawyers and law
teachers is that for the first time in more than a century a single person has
brought together in a single treatise unsolved problems that face us in every
special field of law-teaching and law-practice and has thrown some light upon
the interconnections of these problems. It is not merely that the problems
are thrown together within the binding of a single volume but that they are
bound together by issues of logic, ethics, and social fact which a synoptic vi-
sion has brought into clearer focus. A few sentences from Stone's discussion
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of "controls" illustrates the way in which the fences between the schools
break down when one seeks light, from whatever source, upon a serious
problem.
Lawyers are tempted . . . to relegate such discussions to "politics".
It must, however, be insisted that if they are "politics" then the most
renowned and well accepted juristic writings are also politics. If
Professor Mannheim's thesis is "politics" (in the sense that it does
not concern lawyers) then so must be Jeremy Bentham's reform pro-
gramme which has, for a century, potently influenced the practical
tasks of lawyers. However opposed their theses, the problem is the
same. The view which opposes the extension of social control to-
day is reasserting in the twentieth century context some main teach-
ings of the Benthamite individualists. Such debates develop the
classical juristic debates as to the nature of justice. The shades of
Kant, and Hegel, and their collectivist prototypes Stammler and
Kohler, of Bentham and his collectivist prototype, Ihering, haunt
them. The contemporary debate, however, takes place in the fuller
context of modem sociological inquiry. It touches the meaning of
justice as seen by the light of hard-won understanding of the psy-
chology and psycho-pathology of individuals and of social groups.
The stress upon the dependence of law and justice on other social
phenomena carries on the messages of Montesquieu, and of Savigny.
The importance attributed to various types of social cohesion con-
tinues Durkheim's and Duguit's analyses. The recognition of the
non-rational in individual and social behaviour takes in on the phil-
osophical side work like that of Kohler, Henri Bergson; and on the
psychological side the insights of von Gierke, Tarde, Maitland and
Dicey on the one hand, and of Freud, Le Bon, Pareto, Petrazycki on
the other.'
In an age of specialization when lawyers and law teachers know less and
less about each other's work, this volume comes as a welcome invitation to
cooperative thinking across party walls and party lines. Current problems in
the law of torts, contract, property, and civil liberties are clarified by the ap-
plication of insights which Stone has gathered from the literature of general
jurisprudence. And the theoretical writings of Austin, Bentham, Savigny,
Ihering, Maine, Holmes, Ehrlich, Pound, M11. R. Cohen, Llewellyn, and Frank
are equally clarified by Stone's application of them to new fields and current
controversies.
The usefulness of this volume as a springboard for such discussion and in-
quiry is not lessened by the author's failure to offer pat and final answers to
the perennial questions with which he deals. Indeed, the author's treatment
of these problems strongly suggests that they are perennial precisely because
they have more facets than many generations of observers can measure. This
volume should be particularly useful as a textbook in jurisprudence at any
law school that does not possess a final revelation which renders the study of
1. P. 768.
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other people's ideas useless. But its utility is not limited to courses in juris-
prudence. I know very few law teachers who would not be better teachers of
their own subjects for the reading of Stone's book. In particular it can help
all of us to see that objectivity in legal science is attainable not by dismissing
value judgments but by making our value judgments and their alternatives
explicit.
If it be true that every significant thinker exhibits the defects of his virtues,
it may be said that the defect of Stone's virtue of tolerance for significant
ideas is the respect he shows for high-sounding statements even when they are
devoid of significant content. Repeatedly the words "with respect" trail
along after his criticisms of pronouncements by distinguished writers that
might better be charitably ignored. Copious references to deservedly for-
gotten authors demonstrate the intensity of Mr. Stone's painstaking search
for enlightenment in unlikely quarters. But though they add to the weight
and cost of the volume, they hardly add proportionately to its utility,
Perhaps a significant instance of this undue deference is the respect that
Mr. Stone shows for the classification of "'individual" and "social" interests
developed by Pound, Bohlen, and others. No more than any of hig prede-
cessors does Mr. Stone explain how there can be a social interest that is not
the interest of individuals. Instead of recognizing that any interest what-
ever may be viewed from the standpoint of one individual or all individuals or
some intermediate class, Mr. Stone classifies certain interests as essentially
individual and others as essentially social. Thus the social interest of all of
us in hearing and appraising unsound or unpopular ideas is subordinated in
this analysis to the individual interest of the orator, as if the defense of free
communication rested primarily on the satisfactions of the tongue. The "in-
terest" analysis is particularly unwieldy when the arguments for "freedom of
contract" are given in a chapter on individual interests and the arguments
against "freedom of contract" are given in a chapter on social interests. And
when problems of labor relations, industrial concentration, and human health
are divided up among chapters on individual and social interests, all the
King's horses and men could hardly put the problems together again. That
Mr. Stone clearly recognizes the inadequacy of these classifications hardly
improves matters.
2
Of course, in a volume of this magnitude, it is as easy as it is useless to
pick out details for criticism. It might fairly be noted that although Stone is,
quite apart from this volume, one of the outstanding original workers today
in international law, and particularly in the international protection of mi-
nority rights, he hardly does justice to Vitoria and other Catholic jurist-
theologians in tracing the origins of international law and the idea of the
rights of man. It might be remarked that he sometimes uses the word "syl-
logism" without much regard for its traditional and dictionary meaning, and
that he misses the simplicity of Hohfeld's fundamental idea of prilAga as
absence of legal restraint when he construes it as limited to those rare situa-
2. See pp. 493-5.
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tions where a man's conduct and third party interference with such conduct
are both equally privileged. 3 But of these and other like slips, it may fairly
be said that none of the errors is original and that all of them together do not
amount to much.
Perhaps the most serious lapse from the high general standards of the
volume arises in connection with the author's frequent use of the pejorative
suffix "ism". When he discusses utility, ideas, individuals, and evolution, he
is clear and objective. But, as is the case with other writers, when the dis-
cussion shifts to utilitarianism, idealism, individualism and evolutionism,4 the
emotional overtones of the pejorative suffix introduce serious distortions. In
this again, Mr. Stone's sin is not original but one of the besetting sins of our
age. Indeed, it is the great virtue of this volume that it may help us over the
caricatures that revolve about all our jurisprudential and non-jurisprudential
isms and may help us to see that in jurisprudence, as elsewhere, "labels are
libels."
FELIX S. CouE
POWER AND PERSONALITY. By Harold D. Lasswell. New York: W. W. Nor-
ton and Company, 1948. Pp. 255.
THE ANALYsIs OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR: AN Epn cucA. APPRoacr. By
Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. Pp. ix,
314.
IN two recent books, one a collection of past essays, the other a series of
lectures, Professor Lasswell presents a convenient synthesis of his major
thinking in the field of politics. Despite the diversity of the articles, both
works comprise a substantive and unified study in moral and political phil-
osophy, and it is as such that they will be treated in this review.
The major topics that I have selected for examination are among the most
prominent in both books. They are interrelated, constituting the generic
unity already referred to as moral and political philosophy. The sequential
arrangement of treatment is one of convenience and not a ranking in order of
importance. My list is as follows: (1) nature of science, particularly politi-
cal science; (2) value; (3) modes of thought; (4) ordering of society. A
regrouping is possible, substituting appropriate philosophical designations and
varying with the particular philosophical perspective of the classifier.
The response to such fundamental questions as what kind of science is
politics, what is its proper object of study, what are its ends, what methods
are appropriate, and how are these derived, determine what is studied, how it
is studied and why. The decision denoting the kind of entity to be described
as political is fundamental to political analysis and accounts for the multi-
plicity of such systems.
3. See pp. 120-1. Typically a privilege (e.g., of walking on the public highway) is
backstopped by a right that others shall not interfere.
4. See, e.g., pp. 652-3.
-'Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
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Starting with the premise that science excludes value, a science of politics,
by definition, must exclude it also. Earlier this led Professor Lasswell to
propound the thesis that a science of politics states "conditions" dnd that the
"philosophy of politics justifies preferences".' This division oversimplified
matters, for as Professor Lasswell was aware, value considerations have a
way of intruding into your science. To overcome such difficulties he has es-
tablished a bifurcation of the study of politics into (a) a "contemplative
science" and (b) a "manipulative or operative science." The latter is equated
with "policy science" or "science of democracy," and is "an arsenal of im-
plements for the achievement of democratic ideals"; the former is analytical
and states "conditions." The division is reminiscent of the Aristotelian di-
vision of all science into theoretical ("contemplative") and practical ("opera-
tive"). For Aristotle, however, the theoretical states "conditions" existing
in the physical and natural universe, whereas the practical deals with human
actions and human "preferences".
This brief allusion to Aristotle is illustrative of the contention that any
consideration of the nature of a particular science involves elaborating a theory
of science in general and of the relations of all the sciences to one another.
Method, principles, logic and the rest follow. Good examples of such pro-
cedures among recent thinkers are afforded by the works of Cassirer, M. R.
Cohen, Dewey and Maritain. But aside from a few meager and sometimes
commonplace remarks about science, Professor Lasswell has little to say of a
substantive nature. He is even vague about such key terms as "condition"
and "fact" which occur frequently. The division of science contemplated by
him also contains an implicit theory of truth which is never developed.
The effort to discover what kind of science politics is, raises the question of
value, for, as Professor Lasswell puts it, the variety of values which you take
into consideration determines your definition of politics. He defines the ob-
ject of politics as the study of "influence and the influential." Influence is
equated with the making of "important decisions"-"power"-and "the im-
portance of decisions is measured by their effect on the distribution of values."
What are values? Values are objects of desire, impulses, or that which man
pursues. Politics is a science of values, or more precisely of power, since
power is the architechtonic value within which framework the rest can be
ordered. As a science of that which man pursues (good, value) Professor
Lasswell is up against the same problems faced by Plato and Aristotle when
they speak of a science of the good. But the starting point for the philosopher
is the resting point for him.
Value is taken by Professor Lasswell as given; "our inheritance of brief defi-
nitions [of value] has been adequate." This is the royal lie, the myth, upon
which his thinking on this subject rests. The "supreme democratic value" is
"human dignity." This he defines as the sharing on a broad scale of other
values such as power, deference, and knowledge. As I see it, the supreme
value is really sharing. Sharing in Lasswell's ideal state is what unity is in
1. LAssWELL, POLITICS; WHo GErs WHAT, WHEn, How (1936).
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Plato's. Professor Lasswell prefers to use the honorific term of "human
dignity" and omits reference to an ideal state, leaving it to our culturally
acquired prejudices to select democracy. Why is sharing the suminum bon urn?
We are not told, except that, by definition, sharing and human dignity are
equivalent.
Moral philosophers, Professor Lasswell tells us, "take sentences that
define moral standards and deduce them from more inclusive propositions
or vice-vera-[such derivation] is a notorious blind alley." In this invidious
sense he too is a "moral philosopher." The circular and regressive thinking
with which he charges philosophy is one of the most prominent features of his
own thinking. One can start almost anywhere and make a complete circle of
his terminology. The key terms all convert.
For example, he mentions "democratic morality" of which the "supreme
value" is "human dignity." It is supreme because the society is democratic
and the value is culturally derived--"inherited." The culture is democratic
because its supreme value is "human dignity," by definition. Human dignity
is the wide sharing of values (the objects of desire in a democratic society)
such as power, respect, and knowledge. Stated symbolically, we arrive at the
equation: democratic=human dignity=wide sharing of values ry,,z=dem-
ocratic. Take another case. Let us begin with "power." You have it when
you share in important decisions. Decisions are important in terms of the
distribution of values. If you have more values you have "influence", and if
you have influence you participate in the making of important decisions so
that you now have power which in turn gives you more values. It is a king-
dom of anagrams, circular in form, for which semantic oblations and syntactic
incantations offer no salvation.
Contemporary social thinkers (with such notable exceptions as Professor
Leo Strauss) are excessively preoccupied discussing the problem of value
without going to the sources of the inquiry. One need not rely on the treat-
ments of value which suggest themselves to us from popular acquaintance, i.e.,
the moral and religious philosophers of the perennial tradition. Philosophers
like John Dewey have long argued for a scientific treatment of value. Profes-
sor C. I. Lewis, in Kno-wledge and Valuation, has attempted a classic exposi-
tion from an empirical standpoint: "It has been held that value-apprehen-
sions are subjective or relative in a sense which is incompatible with their
genuinely cognitive significance. . ..But this is one of the strangest aberra-
tions ever to visit the mind of man .. . this negation, if it be carried out
consistently, likewise invalidates all knowledge." Professor Lasswell's posi-
tion is an ambivalent one. It implies moral and practical cynicism while simul-
taneously upholding a conception of normative science.
In the same vein of oversimplification tangential to a wealthy literature on
the subject, Professor Lasswell discusses modes of thought which he describes
as intellectual skills, with which the elite in a democratic society must equip
itself if it is to lead effectively. These are five in number: goal thinking, de-
rivational thinking, trend thinking, scientific thinking, and projective thinking.
Taken together they constitute "the configurative method" and the armor of
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the policy scientist implementing and manipulating. His exposition is scant.
Goal thinking is supposed to clarify the aims of action. Derivational thinking
is only a second class mode of thought. It "is the technique, for instance, of
justifying the dignity of man by invoking statements of higher abstractness,
such as God's will or metaphysical principle of light and darkness." Professor
Lasswell confesses he has not much use for it. My observation is that he
overindulges in it. Trend thinking is historical, scientific thinking is describerl
in one short paragraph, projective thinking "implies a picture of the future."
In discussing the proper ordering of society Professor Lasswell reveals him-
self most as a moral and political philosopher. Compare him in this respect to
Plato and the result is a case of atrophied Platonism.
Plato inquires directly whether there is an ideally best society. Lasswell
skirts the issue and leaves you to infer that it is democratic as he defines it.
The good life becomes the democratic one. Evil is a privation of democratic
and is considered pathologic. Plato develops a concept of justice for the indi-
vidual from the analogy of the state, "justice writ large." In Lasswell's terms
this becomes the problem of sustaining a dynamic equilibrium and bringing
about the formation of democratic personality. Both enter the related fields of
psychology, education, logic, and metaphysics. For Plato, the political prob-
lem and the philosophic problem are one. For Lasswell, the latter does not
exist. Both deal extensively with elite recruitment. Both make functional
analyses of the component groups within society. Both identify virtue and
knowledge. Professor Lasswell deals with the same problems of traditional
moral and political philosophy, the mode of discourse is in the rationalist tradi-
tion, and the orientation is in many respects oddly Platonic.
OSCAR WILLIAM PERLMUTTERt
CICERO AND THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. By F. R. Cowell. With a Preface by
Allan Nevins. New York: Chanticleer Press, 1948. Pp. xvii, 306. $5.00.
THIs book deals in the main with the Roman Republic rather than Cicero,
because "before we can see Cicero, his friends and enemies as living human
beings going to bed late at night after an exhausting day crowded with public
and private business, it is necessary to know something about this framework
of Roman politics and the levers and cogwheels by which it was set in mo-
tion." And it is a colorful picture, indeed, that the author draws I True to
modern taste, he is particularly careful in giving the economic background of
the time from the overthrow of the legendary monarchy to Caesar. Nowhere
else can a reader get as lucid an information of the devastating influence of
the Second Punic War on Roman agriculture or of the life and activities of
all the classes of the Roman people. Besides the socio-economic phases, the
author covers a good deal of diplomatic history, of Rome's colonial system,
and of her military organization. His description of the confused system of
elections and votes and of the overlapping authorities of the various conitia
t Lecturer, University College, University of Chicago.
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and the Senate culminate aptly in the author's refutation of the often-heard
nonsense, invented first by Polybius, about the "balance of power" that sup-
posedly existed in the Roman constitution. As a matter of fact, it was the
utter instability of Rome's system of government that was a primary reason for
the undoing of the republic.
The modern politician should take delight in reading the author's excerpts
from an election guide written by Cicero's brother, Quintus. Craftily it ad-
vises a candidate that the word "friend" has a "wider application during a
canvass than in other times"; that he must have-and display-a great many
hangers-on and admirers, whose gossip must be carefully influenced; that he
must attract the businessmen by rhetoric, the aristocrats by convincing them
of the candidate's aversion against demagogues, the upper classes in general
by promises of peace and security, and the people by "telling them that you
are on the popular side"; and lastly that it is advisable to start "some new
scandal against our competitors for crime or looseness of life or corruption."
The struggle, at times of catastrophic dimensions, between patricians and
plebeians is well narrated. The author makes it clear enough that this was not
a class struggle in the modem sense. Both patricians and plebeians were free
landowners and slaveholders. But the former suppressed the latter and de-
nied them any political rights as long as they could. In describing this
struggle, however, Mr. Colwell fails to analyze the crucial question of what
made a man a patrician. If he had, he probably would have found himself
impelled to follow the widely accepted theory established by Arangio-Ruiz
that the patricians, even as the early kings, were the members of the ruling
Etruscan-Semitic families from whom the Italic, Indo-Germanic newcomers
gradually wrestled the political power. Perhaps the author did not like this
idea, for he frequently contrasts the "heroic" Romans with both the Semitic
Carthaginians and the oriental peoples of the Near East
The book is not free from inaccuracies. Thus lawyers will be amazed at the
author's doubt that under the Twelve Tables creditors, if there were more
than one, were allowed to cut the debtor to pieces. The law even had a provi-
sion to the effect that taking more than a proportionate share of the unfor-
tunate bankrupt's flesh was not to be considered a tort. The author's idea
that the Roman "jury trial" was somehow a forerunner of ours-which in
fact stems from the Normans and Franks and has nothing in common with
Roman procedure-could have been corrected by consulting any handbook on
legal history.
Students of Cicero will miss a list of his works. Students of history or of
Bertrand Russell will not trust their eyes when reading the assertion that
judged by our standards, the scientific achievements of the Greeks in the fields
of mathematics or astronomy were "undoubtedly slight." Moreover, it is re-
grettable that the learned author devotes hardly one half of a page to what
Cicero had to say about the natural law idea. The author's short discussion
of that topic is placed into a section called "Cicero on Roman Law" and that
in itself is a mistake. For natural law, if ever such a thing could exist, is es-
sentially not "Roman" or any other positive law, but necessarily universal.
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Many will probably disagree with the book's appraisal of Cicero, the states-
man. It is not only the author's conservatism that must arouse opposition, but
his failure to make clear the ideal for which Cicero is supposed to have stood.
It is "freedom", we hear. But whose freedom? That of the masses never
existed, as the author himself makes clear beyond doubt. Cowell has failed to
let us know what specific freedom or freedoms Cicero cherished, unless we
accept Cicero's realization, after Caesar had assumed power, "that he was no
longer free to live his old life of strenuous activity in the stimulating, exciting,
rough and tumble of politics in the Senate and in the crowded Forum" as
something akin to freedom as we understand it. Politics in those days bene-
fitted a small, select group of people, whose ambition it was to rule. It is the
author himself who shows us how the masses and the slaves lived in abject
misery. Therefore, why lament about the fact that a well-meaning albeit am-
bitious Caesar took away the freedom of being a politician from a few
Ciceros?
The author uncritically joins those who think highly of Cicero's suppres-
sion of Catiline's rebellion. It is perhaps true that Catiline was not a true
revolutionary hero but rather a despicable roughneck. Yet because of Cicero's
"unquestioning belief in the sacred rights of private property" he did not op-
pose Sulla, who was a mass-murderer unequalled until very recent days. Ob-
viously it was Cicero and his class with their belief in property, but not in
other people's human right, that brought about men like Lucius Sergius Cati-
lina. The beginning of Cicero's consularship stood in the shadow of the pro-
posed Lex Rulla, supported by Caesar, that would have given Rome what it
needed more than anything else, namely, an agrarian reform. When Cicero
succeeded in defeating the reform, the rebellion knocked at the door. And
when that was crushed, Caesar came.
REGINALD PARKE t
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UNDERHILL MOORE
The death of Professor Moore in 1949 deprived the legal community at large and
the Yale Law School in particular of a penetrating thinker and 
a stimulating
teacher. The Editors of the JOURNAL dedicate this issue to his memory.

